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In 1965, Congress responded to a growing need for financial assist-
ance to students in higher education by enacting the Higher Education
Act of 1965.' Among the programs of student assistance created by the
Act,2 Congress established the Guaranteed Student Loan Program
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1. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. IV, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1060-1098 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); see also S. REP. No. 673, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 41-46, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4059.
2. Most federal funds are channeled through five principal aid programs: (1) the Pell
Grant Program (formerly the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant Program), (2) the Sup-
plemental Educational Opportunity Grant Program, (3) the College Work-Study Program,
(4) the National Direct Student Loan Program, and (5) the Guaranteed Student Loan Pro-
gram which is the focus of this article.
The Pell Grant Program provides grants to needy students on the basis of the financial
resources of the student and/or his or her family, the student's enrollment status, and the
cost of his or her education. Generally, such grants are transferred to the educational insti-
tution for disbursement to the recipients.
The Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (SEOG) Program supplements the
Pell Grant Program. Unlike the Pell grants, however, participating schools administer this
program. Institutions apply annually to the federal government for necessary funds, and the
school's financial aid officer selects the recipients and determines the size of their grants.
Such grants are provided to students who demonstrate exceptional financial need, and who
otherwise would not be able to obtain post-secondary instruction.
The College Work-Study (CWS) Program is designed to promote part-time employ-
ment of students needing funds to attend post-secondary institutions. While CWS has been
restructured to provide more assistance to students from middle-income families, low-in-
come students are the usual participants.
Under the National Direct Student Loan (NDSL) Program, schools are provided with
loan funds so that the school may provide low-interest (5%), deferred-repayment loans to
students who are in financial need. The school puts up only 10% of the money used for these
loans, and the federal government contributes the remaining 90%. The student-borrower
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(GSLP),3 under which students may obtain low interest 4 educational
loans from private lenders. The loans are guaranteed either by the fed-
eral government or by a state or private guaranty agency.5 In the event
of a student's default, death, disability, or bankruptcy, the federal gov-
ernment reimburses the lender for the unpaid principal balance and
any interest owed. 6 The student's payment of both principal and inter-
est is deferred during a six- to twelve-month grace period after the stu-
dent graduates or leaves school; during that period the federal
government pays interest to the lender.7 In addition to the stated inter-
est on the loans, lenders are paid a special allowance designed to make
the rate of return on GSLP loan notes comparable to rates available on
does not pay interest on the NDSL loan while attending school and is given a grace period
after attendance ends before repayment begins. See Tate, FederalAid to Postsecondary Stu-
dents, 18 J. FAM. L. 147 (1979); OFFICE OF STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., OSFA PROGRAM BOOK 32-33 (1981).
3. The Guaranteed Student Loan Program (GSLP) was established by the Higher
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. IV, pt. B, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1097 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
4. The Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367, established
new interest rate ceilings for GSLP loans that cover periods of instruction commencing on or
after January 1, 1981. With respect to such loans the interest rate (1) may not exceed 7%
annually if the borrower already has an outstanding balance of principal or interest with
respect to any loan made, insured, or guaranteed under the GSLP and (2) may not exceed
9% annually if the borrower, on the date of entering into the obligation, has no outstanding
balahce with respect to any GSLP loan, except that if the average rate of 91 -day Treasury
bills auctioned in any 12-month period on or after January 1, 1981 is equal to or less than
9%, the interest rate for the GSLP loan will be 8% annually. For all other GSLP loans made
after August 3, 1968, the maximum rate of annual interest may not exceed 7%. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1077(a), (b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The GSLP is comprised of two compo-
nents: the guaranty agency programs pursuant to which state agencies guarantee loans
under a reinsurance agreement with the federal government, and the Federal Insured Stu-
dent Loan Program (FISLP) through which the federal government guarantees student
loans directly in those areas where state guaranty agency loans are unavailable. Although
most guaranteed student loans were made through the FISLP during the first decade of the
GSLP, the FISLP share of the federal government's guaranty commitments has diminished
as more states have established guaranty agency programs. At present less than 10% of all
new GSLP loan commitments are made through the FISLP. The remaining 90% represent
federal guarantees of state guaranty agency commitments (i.e., reinsurance). See OFFICE OF
STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN
PROGRAM: LOAN VOLUME UPDATE, FY 1981 (1981).
6. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1080(a), 1087 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7. Section 413(c) of the Education Amendments of 1980 defers the repayment of
GSLP loans, which cover the period of instruction beginning on or after January 1, 1981, for
six months after the date of the borrower's graduation or withdrawal from school. See 20
U.S.C. § 1077(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For loans covering periods beginning prior to
that date, the borrower's grace period may extend not less than nine, nor more than twelve,
months following the borrower's graduation or withdrawal from school. The precise length
of the latter "grace period" is determined by the lender at the time the loan is made. Id
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other investments."
Although guaranteed student loans were initially limited to low-
income students, eligibility for the loans was gradually expanded. In
1978, the program was opened to all students regardless of income, 9
only to be again restricted beginning with the 1982-83 academic year to
students with family incomes below $30,000.10 With the troubled eco-
nomic conditions and skyrocketing educational costs of the 1970's and
1980's, more students have come to rely upon guaranteed student loans
to finance their educations." The increased need for financial assist-
ance, coupled with the broadening of student eligibility for guaranteed
loans, has resulted in an explosion of the number of students applying
for and receiving such loans.'
2
As a consequence, guaranteed student loans have become the prin-
cipal source of student financial assistance.'3 Not surprisingly, a con-
commitant effect of greater student dependence on guaranteed loans
has been the greater dependence of post-secondary schools on the
availability of such loan monies to establish and maintain enrollment
levels. 14 Without such loans, many students would be unable to pursue
higher education, and many schools would be forced to close.15
The linchpin of the GSLP has been the willingness of private lend-
erst 6 to participate in the program. 17 Their continued participation re-
quires that the federal government make GSLP loans sufficiently
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.301-.302 (1982). See
infra notes 24-26 & accompanying text (discussion of special allowances).
9. The Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-566, § 6(c)(1),
93 Stat. 2402, removed the income guidelines so that all borrowers were entitled to receive
interest subsidy payments under the GSLP.
10. Section 532 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
95 Stat. 451 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1089 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), reimposed a "financial
needs test" for GSLP interest subsidy eligibility, whereby only students with family incomes
below $30,000 qualify.
11. See Jenkins, Regulation of Colleges and Universities Under the Guaranteed Student
Loan Program, 4 J.C. & U.L. 13, 15 (1976).
12. Since the program's inception, the federal government has insured an estimated 18
million loans valued at nearly $30 billion. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STUDENT FI-
NANCIAL ASSISTANCE, GUARANTEED STUDENT LOANS: A BACKGROUND PAPER 1 (1982).
The volume of loans during the three years following the 1978 elimination of income eligi-
bility guidelines equalled the total volume during the preceding 13 years. Id at 24.
13. Id at 1.
14. See Jenkins, supra note II, at 15.
15. See id at 18.
16. The following institutions are eligible to be the GSLP lenders: state and federally
chartered banks, savings and loans, and credit unions; pension funds; insurance companies;
state or private non-profit agencies designated by a state; the Student Loan Marketing Asso-
ciation (Sallie Mae); and participating educational institutions that are not solely correspon-
dence schools and employ at least one full-time financial aid administrator. See 34 C.F.R.
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attractive investments by achieving a balance between the lenders' risks
and the return that they can expect on their investments. 18 Congress
has enacted a number of measures to achieve this balance and to en-
courage lender participation. 19 In recent years, however, the balance
between risk and reward has been upset as a result of the attitude and
reaction of the Department of Education (Department),20 which ad-
ministers the GSLP, to the unexpectedly high cost of the program.
The initial alarm sounded in the late 1970's, when the default rate
on student loans guaranteed under the GSLP surpassed all projections.
By the end of fiscal year 1980, over $1.4 billion in GSLP default claims
had been paid by the Department of Education, 21 representing an over-
all default rate in excess of twelve percent. 22 From 1978 through 1980,
default claims averaged over $200 million per year.
2 3
§ 682.100 (1982). This Article focuses primarily on the problems encountered by lenders
that are not educational institutions.
17. Windsor Univ. v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 550 F.2d 1203, 1204-05
(9th Cir. 1977). For many, if not most, lenders there has been an expectation that the GSLP
would be no more administratively burdensome than the FHA and VA loan guarantee pro-
grams. See VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, LENDERS HANDBOOK, VA PAMPHLET 26-27 (rev.
ed. 1977); FEDERAL HOME ADMINISTRATION, LENDERS HANDBOOK (1975).
18. See infra notes 33-38 & accompanying text (discussion of lender incentives to par-
ticipate in the GSLP).
19. See infra notes 39-53 & accompanying text (examples of congressional measures
designed to encourage lender participation).
20. From its inception until May 4, 1980, the GSLP was administered by the Office of
Education of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Pursuant to § 601 of The
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, tit. VI, 93 Stat. 696 (1980),
the Office of Education was reorganized and the Department of Education (the Department)
was created. In the process, the administration of the GSLP was transferred to the Secretary
of Education. All references herein to the Department of Education include its predecessor,
the Office of Education.
21. See OSFA PROGRAM BOOK, supra note 2, at 43.
22. Id. Actual government losses from defaults total just under 6% after adjustments
are made for post-default collection efforts by the Department. Id It should be noted,
however, that the 6% figure does not include any adjustment upward for the cost of post-
default collections.
23. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN IN-
FORMATION SYSTEM NEEDS A THOROUGH REDESIGN TO ACCOUNT FOR THE EXPENDITURE
OF BILLIONS app. 11 (1981). A number of causes have been cited for the high rate of default.
Until recently, once lenders' default claims had been paid and the defaulted loan notes were
assigned to the Department for collection, the federal government pursued only a small
percentage of defaulting students. See infra note 132 (discussion of the Department's failure
to pursue post-default collections). Without some reasonable expectation that the Depart-
ment would seek repayment on such defaulted loans, it is not surprising that so many stu-
dents chose not to repay their loans. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STUDENT FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 23.
Another frequent cause of student borrowers' failure to repay guaranteed student loans
lies in student dissatisfaction with their schools. The federal government in no way warrants
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Simultaneously, a second and even more costly source of bur-
geoning program expenditures emerged, namely, special allowance
payments to lenders that are tied to the average quarterly rate of inter-
the quality of education provided by schools participating in the GSLP. See Rattler v. Ca-
reer Academy, Inc., No. 75-1302, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1976), where the court held that
the Commissioner of Education satisfied his statutory duties by determining that the school
had been accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency. The court noted that
"[i]f more active policing of the method of selection of students and the curriculums adopted
by. . . institutions participating in the FISL program is to be required of the Commissioner,
it must be by congressional legislation .... " Id. at 3. Nevertheless, many students who
have been dissatisfied with their educations have simply refused to repay their loans. See
Guaranteed Student Loan Program: Hearings Be/ore the Permanent Subcomm. on Investiga-
lions of the Senate Comm on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 348, 353-54
(1975) (testimony of William 0. Goodman of the Attorney General's Office of Texas) [here-
inafter cited as 1975 Senate Hearings].
A third cause of student defaults is that lenders have failed to exercise due diligence in
the servicing and collection of loans. See infra notes 116-49 & accompanying text (discus-
sion of due diligence requirements). Most often, the lender simply loses track of the bor-
rower. As in the case of the Department's failure to pursue students after default, when
student borrowers are not pursued by lenders the chances of default increase substantially.
A number of studies have attempted to develop a demographic profile of the defaulting
student borrower. See Bergen, Bergen & Miller, Do G.P.A. and Loan Size Affect NDSL
Repayments?, 13 J. C. STUDENT PERSONNEL 65 (1972); Dyl & McGann, Discriminant Analy-
sis of Student Loan Applications, 7 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 35 (1977); Spencer, Risk Measure-
mentfor Short Term Loans, 4 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 30 (1974); see also Emmert, National
Direct Student Loan Default Rates: A Measure of.Administrative Quality or Something Else?,
8 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 43 (1978) (review of current studies). The picture that emerges
suggests that, independent of efforts by the Department or individual schools and lenders,
some groups of student borrowers are inherently more likely to default. For instance, one
researcher described the worst possible loan risk as "a student without a phone, unmarried,
in his [last] semester, with an old car, 17 years old (or over 26), male, with a large loan, who
is unemployed." Spencer, supra, at 32. This last cause of student defaults-the inherent
unreliability of some students themselves---is precisely the risk that Congress undertook in
guaranteeing loans to students, who as a class are considered to be traditionally poor credit
risks. See Higher Education Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 600 Before the Subcomm. on Educa-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1965);
Emmert, supra, at 46. Congress and the Department have taken a number of steps, with
limited success, to reduce losses arising from defaults. More rigorous post-default collection
efforts have been instituted, including expansion of the corps of government collection
agents, greater use of outside collection agencies, and the use of credit bureaus and Internal
Revenue Service records to track borrowers. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STUDENT FINAN-
CIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 24. Moreover, schools with excessively high default
rates are subject to suspension or termination from the program. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.611
(1982). Finally, the gradual shift since 1976 from direct federal insurance under the FISLP
to reinsurance through state guaranty agencies has generally resulted in lower default rates,
and has at least stemmed the rapid escalation of defaults experienced in earlier years. See
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 24. See
generally Leonard, Skipping Out on Alma Mater: Some Problems Involving the Collection of
Federal Student Loans, 5 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 317 (1980) (examination of remedial
measures to reduce default). Nevertheless, as indicated in the text, GSLP loan defaults have
continued apace.
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est for Treasury bills.24 Unfortunately, the depressed economy during
the late 1970's and early 1980's, and the attendant record-setting inter-
est rates, have resulted in enormous increases in the special allowances
paid to lenders. 25 Specifically, special allowances rose from a high of
approximately 3% in 1977 to 11.5% in 1981, an increase from $106 mil-
lion in 1977 to $1.5 billion in 1981.26
Given the budgetary pressures resulting from the rising cost of the
GSLP, lenders have been placed in an increasingly precarious position
by the Department. Earlier, the Department focused its efforts on ob-
taining maximum participation from the lending community.27 Re-
cently, however, at least with regard to the Federally Insured Student
Loan Program (FISLP), the focus has shifted to the careful scrutinizing
of lenders' default claims, with a view toward allocating more of the
risk of loss to lenders and thus minimizing government outlays by de-
nying coverage for any technical violations of program requirements.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pointedly
remarked in Hicks v. Harris,28 "[t]he government, faced with escalating
insurance claims under the [FISLP] . . .evidently has looked to tech-
nical infringements of the letter of its regulations as a shield against
lenders' claims for reimbursement on loans made pursuant to its
invitation.
'29
The reallocation of the risk of loss arising from student defaults
may cause lenders to opt out of the program in favor of alternative
investments. In fact, this movement may have already started as in-
creasing numbers of lenders liquidate their student loan portfolios by
selling their GSLP notes to the Student Loan Marketing Association,
commonly known as Sallie Mae. 30 Such sales have increased faster
24. Under the statutory formula for calculating the level of special allowances, the rate
of special allowance for a three-month period is determined by subtracting 3.5% from the
average of the rate of 91-day Treasury bills auctioned during the preceding three-month
period, rounding to the nearest one eighth of one percent and dividing the resulting percent
by four. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-1(b)(2) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 682.301(c) (1982).
25. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 12,
at 23.
26. Id.; OSFA PROGRAM BOOK, supra note 2, at 37.
27. WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE COLLEGE BOARD, THE GUARANTEED STUDENT
LOAN PROGRAM: OPTIONS FOR CONTROLLING FEDERAL COSTS WHILE PRESERVING
NEEDED CREDIT FOR COLLEGE 1 (May 1981).
28. 606 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1979).
29. Id. at 67 n.2.
30. Student Assistance Amendments of 1981: Hearing on S. 1108 Before the Subcomm.
on Education, Arts and Humanities of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 237 (1981) (testimony of Edward A. Fox, President, Student Loan
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than increases in the volume of new loans,3' while the number of lend-
ers participating in the GSLP has steadily decreased.32 Thus, the likely
long-term effect of the Department's policies will be that, with de-
creased lender participation, the Congressional purposes underlying
the creation of the GSLP will be frustrated, with students, schools, and
the quality of American education being the ultimate losers.
This Article will examine how the reallocation of risk from the
federal government to lenders has been effected by the Department of
Education through changes in regulatory interpretation. In particular,
the Article will focus on two areas in which the Department has
changed its attitude toward lenders: payments of illegal inducements
and due diligence requirements for loan collection and default claim
submission. As the following discussion illustrates, regardless of
whether one adopts an analysis based on the statutory requirements for
proper administrative procedure, on contract law, or on the policies un-
derlying particular GSLP regulatory requirements, there are serious
questions as to the propriety of the Department's treatment of lenders
under the program. In turn, these questions raise important and funda-
mental questions regarding future financial support for higher educa-
tion in this country.
Background of Lenders' Participation in the Guaranteed
Student Loan Program
Lender Incentives
The premise underlying congressional enactment of the GSLP was
that funds would be made available for student financial assistance by
leveraging private capital. This result was to be accomplished in three
ways. First, private lenders' risks were to be minimized through federal
loan guarantees. 33 Second, interest on the loans was to be wholly sub-
sidized while the student borrowers were in school.34 Third, although
the loans themselves were to be made at interest rates substantially be-
low market,35 lenders would be guaranteed an acceptable rate of return
Marketing Association) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate Hearings]. See infra note 41 &
accompanying text (explanation of nature and purpose of Sallie Mae).
31. Since fiscal year 1978, increases in the volume of GSLP loan commitments by the
Department have averaged about 58% a year. See OSFA PROGRAM BOOK, supra note 2, at
38. Increases in lender sales of GSLP notes, on the other hand, have averaged almost 70%.
See STUDENT LOAN MARETiNG ASSOCIATION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 32 (1982).
32. 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 240.
33. See 20 U.S.C. § 1080(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34. See id § 1078(a)(3).
35. See id § 1077(b); Jenkins, supra note 11, at 14.
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by means of variable special allowances paid by the federal govern-
ment, over and above the notes' stated interest rate.
36
In addition to the low risk nature of the loans and the guaranteed
rate of return, lenders have participated in the program for intangible
reasons. Among the indirect benefits derived from making student
loans has been good will in the communities where the lenders do busi-
ness and, in particular, the good will of parents of the students receiv-
ing such loans which often translates into deposits. 37 Also, lenders
have been attracted by the prospect of establishing banking relation-
ships with the students themselves, who by reason of their education
are more likely to become profitable banking customers.
38
Throughout the history of the program, beyond the incentives de-
scribed above, Congress has constantly taken steps to maintain and
promote lender participation. For instance, a study commissioned by
Congress in 1970 revealed that lenders had very limited funds with
which to make student loans, and once these funds were committed,
lenders were unwilling to make new loans.39 Consequently, Congress
provided greater liquidity to lenders by fostering an active secondary
market for guaranteed student loans. In particular, in 1972 Congress
established the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) as a
government-sponsored, but privately owned, profit-making corpora-
tion.40 Sallie Mae provides lenders with additional funds for making
student loans, either by directly purchasing guaranteed student loan
notes, or by advancing funds to lenders while using those lenders'
GSLP notes as collateral.
41
To increase the rate of return for lenders, Congress ensured that
36. See supra note 24 (explanation of special allowances); Jenkins, supra note 11, at 14.
37. Cole, Why Student Loans Are Beginning to Look More Attractive to Lenders, 70
BANKING 84 (1978); GORDON & ERRECART, A SURVEY OF LENDERS IN THE GUARANTEED
STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM 107-08 (Dec. 1975) (available from United States Department of
Education, National Institute of Education, Educational Resources Information Center
(ERIC)).
38. Cole, supra note 37, at 93; GORDON & ERRECART, supra note 37, at 108.
39. LYBRAND, Ross BROS. & MONTGOMERY, SURVEY OF LENDER PRACTICES RELAT-
ING TO THE GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM 6 (1970).
40. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
41. Under the Loan Purchase Program, Sallie Mae offers to buy student loans outright
from GSLP lending institutions. Through the Warehousing Advance Program, begun in
October 1973, a lender can borrow against such loans, using all or part of its student loan
portfolio or other eligible securities as collateral. The lender can receive a cash advance of
up to 100% of the face value of the pledged collateral. Proceeds from a warehousing ad-
vance, however, must be reinvested in student loans. See id § 1087-2(d); Smith, Why Stu-
dents Can Still Get Loans, 4 AM. EDUC. 6 (1978); STUDENT LOAN MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 31, at 4.
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special allowance payments would be continually revised to keep guar-
anteed student loans competitive with other investments.42 Recently,
Congress authorized lenders to charge students a five percent origina-
tion fee for making GSLP loans.43 In addition, in order to accelerate
claim processing by the Department with respect to loans insured di-
rectly by the federal government, Congress now requires that the De-
partment process and either pay or reject lenders' default claims within
ninety days.44 To compensate lenders for the added cost of making
periodic multiple disbursements,4 5 Congress has also provided interest
and special allowance payments on the entire principal amount, includ-
ing the undisbursed portion.46 Finally, Congress has given lenders
greater access to the courts by allowing lenders to sue the federal gov-
ernment in any federal district court or state court of record.
47
With regard to state guaranty agencies, Congress has cleared the
way for states to provide lenders with a number of additional incen-
tives as well. For example, state guaranty agencies may act as escrow
agents to hold the undisbursed portions of loans, thereby shouldering
the administrative cost of making multiple disbursements. 48 Congress
has also underwritten the costs incurred by such agencies in providing
lenders with accounting services for computing interest and special al-
lowances,49 pre-default collection assistance, 50 and the monitoring of
student enrollment status.51
42. See supra note 24 (explaitation of how the rate of special allowances is computed).
43. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 536, 95 Stat. 357,
455-56 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
44. Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, § 422, 94 Stat. 1367, (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1080(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). Even prior to enactment of the
Education Amendments of 1980, the Department had an obligation under former § 1080(a)
to promptly pay default claims, but that obligation was often ignored. As the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Human Resources noted in 1980, "[t]he Committee is informed that, in
some cases, payments to insured beneficiaries under [20 U.S.C. § 1080(a)] ... have been
withheld for indefinite periods without any determination of wrongdoing or lack of due
diligence on the part of the insured beneficiaries. The Committee believes that such actions
discouraged vital participation by lending institutions and are contrary to the express direc-
tives of the Act." S. REP. No. 733, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1980).
45. Lenders have been encouraged to make partial periodic disbursements of loans as
funds are needed for students' educations, rather than lump sum disbursements, in order to
minimize government exposure in cases where students withdraw from school. See 34
C.F.R. § 682.302(c) (1982).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(a)(8) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); S. REP. No. 733, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 35 (1980).
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
48. Id § 1078(i).
49. Id § 1078(f)(1)(A), (3)(A).
50. Id § 1078(t1)(C), (3)(C).
51. Id § 1078(f)(1)(D), (3)(D).
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Perhaps just as important as the concrete measures taken by Con-
gress to promote lender participation are those measures rejected by
Congress that would have tended to discourage lender participation.
For instance, Congress has refused to require lenders to administer
financial needs tests to students for the purpose of determining student
eligibility.52 Similarly, Congress has refused to terminate the interest
subsidy paid by the federal government while students are in school.
53
Regulatory Ambiguity
In light of Congress' active recruitment of lenders to participate in
the GSLP, and given lenders' obvious need for guidance in meeting the
complex GSLP requirements, the Department was surprisingly slow in
developing meaningful regulations. 54 The first regulations, promul-
gated in 1966, provided little more guidance than the statute itself.
55
Somewhat more comprehensive regulations were issued in 1970,56 then
revised in 1979 and reissued in 1982. 57 Until the 1979 revisions, how-
ever, critical aspects of lender participation in the program were left
unclear.
58
The principal source of guidance in implementing the FISLP por-
tion of the GSLP has been the Manual For Lenders, a program guide-
book prepared by the Department and distributed to participating
lenders.59 This manual is also used extensively, with other sources, by
the Department claims examiners in reviewing default claims.
60
52. Instead, the determination of financial need is made by states, educational institu-
tions, or private organizations under contract with the Department. Id § 1090(a).
53. As the Senate Budget Committee noted when rejecting a proposal to eliminate the
in-school interest subsidy, "[tihe Committee firmly believes, based on testimony from lend-
ers and others, that elimination of the in-school interest subsidy would result in a precipitous
and progressive drop in lender participation." S. REP. No. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 894
(1981); see also WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE COLLEGE BOARD, sUpra note 27, at 2.
54. The regulations promulgated by the Department and its predecessor, the Office of
Education, are incorporated by reference into the Contract of Insurance executed by each
lender and the government. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.503(a)(2) (1982).
55. See 31 Fed. Reg. 6109 (1966).
56. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 177.1-.51 (1973) (originally promulgated in 1970 in 35 Fed. Reg.
16,888 (1970)).
57. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 177.100-.713 (1979) (currently 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.100-.713 (1982);
44 Fed. Reg. 53,868 (1979).
58. See, e.g., &'fa notes 67-149 & accompanying text for discussion of illegal induce-
ments and due diligence in the collection of loans.
59. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, FED-
ERAL INSURED STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM MANUAL FOR LENDERS (1972) as amended (1976)
[hereinafter cited as MANUAL FOR LENDERS].
60. Other than the MANUAL FOR LENDERS, the Department officials have two sources
of guidance in applying program requirements. The first is the REGIONAL CLAIMS PROCE-
[Vol. 34
From the lenders' point of view, however, the Department's use of
the Manual For Lenders raises additional questions as to what are or
are not regulatory requirements. Unlike the Higher Education Act and
the regulations promulgated thereunder, the Manual For Lenders can
impose no requirements of its own force.61 It is only a reflection of the
Department's interpretation of the Act and the regulations. 62 In a
number of instances, however, the Manual For Lenders contains re-
quirements not found in the statute and regulations, and others that are
contrary to the statute and regulations.6 3 Nevertheless, some courts
have taken the approach that the Manual For Lenders is binding upon
FISLP lenders, as if it were in fact part of the lenders' insurance
contracts.64
Amid this mosaic of regulatory requirements and quasi-require-
ments, lenders have often been forced to guess about the nature of their
responsibilities. 65 As the following discussion illustrates, problems now
encountered by lenders filing default claims with the Department often
DURES manual, prepared for use by the Department regional claims personnel. U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REGIONAL CLAIMS PROCEDURES (rev. 4th ed.)
[hereinafter cited as REGIONAL CLAIMS PROCEDURES]. The second is a compilation of opin-
ions issued by the Department's Office of General Counsel and located in the Bureau of
Student Financial Assistance [hereinafter cited as Off. Gen. Counsel Opinions]. Neither of
these sources is generally available to lenders, but both are helpful in explaining ambiguities
in the regulations and the MANUAL FOR LENDERS, and in showing how program require-
ments have actually been applied.
61. The MANUAL FOR LENDERS has never been published in the Federal Register; con-
sequently, it has no legal effect apart from its restatement of the statute and regulations.
Sky, Rulemaking in the Office of Education, 26 AD. L. REv. 129, 131 n. I (1974); see General
Education Provisions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 431, 84 Stat. 169 (1970) (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1232 (1976)).
62. Moreover, even within the context of lenders' insurance contracts, the MANUAL
FOR LENDERS is not binding because, unlike the regulations, the requirements of the manual
are not incorporated by reference into the insurance contracts. See MANUAL FOR LENDERS,
supra note 59, 1 1.3.1 & apps. A.12-.13 (rev. ed. 1976) (sample insurance contracts). Never-
theless, the MANUAL FOR LENDERS is sometimes useful in interpreting ambiguous provi-
sions in the Act and the regulations.
63. For instance, the 1972 edition of the MANUAL FOR LENDERS States that "if a bor-
rower's institution loses its eligibility, he enters the grace period at that point." MANUAL
FOR LENDERS, supra note 59, at VII-1 (1972). In a 1975 memorandum, however, the De-
partment's Office of General Counsel concluded that the above-quoted statement from the
MANUAL FOR LENDERS was not supported by any provision in the Act or regulations. See
Memorandum from Office of General Counsel to Associate Commissioner Kenneth A.
Kohl, Off. Gen. Counsel Opinions (August 27, 1975). The cited provision was deleted from
the 1976 edition of the MANUAL.
64. See American Bank v. United States, 633 F.2d 543 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 942 (D.C.W. Va. 1981); American Say. v. Bell, No.
79-1834, (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1980) (summary judgment denied).
65. See infra notes 113-15 & accompanying text.
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find their genesis in the ambiguities of the regulatory requirements, and
in the Department's own contradictory policies with respect to enforc-
ing those requirements.
Specific Problems Encountered By Lenders: Administrative
Fiat Versus Administrative Rulemaking
Default claims filed by lenders have been denied for a myriad of
reasons.66 Two categories of denial, however, deserve special attention'
and scrutiny. The first involves the regulatory prohibition against the
payment of inducements by schools to influence lenders to make GSLP
loans, and the effect of such violations of the regulations on the Depart-
ment's guaranty obligations. The second involves the nature of lend-
ers' duties to exercise due diligence in the making, servicing, and
collection of FISLP loans and in the submission of default claims to the
Department.
Payment of Illegal Inducements to Influence Lenders to Make GSLP Loans
In 1970, the Department promulgated 45 C.F.R. § 177.6(e),
prohibiting the payment of "points, premiums, or additional interest of
any kind" to an eligible lender "in order to secure funds for making
loans or to induce such a lender to make loans to the students of a
particular institution .... -67 The regulation further provided that
GSLP loans made by educational institutions could not be sold or
transferred at discount.
68
The purpose of prohibiting such payments or discounts was two-
fold. First, the Department perceived a need to protect student bor-
rowers by preventing schools from incurring additional costs and then
passing these costs on to the students in the form of higher tuition
charges.69 Second, the agency sought to make student loan funds avail-
66. Grounds for denial arise, for example, where the disbursement date falls before the
commitment date, the claim is in hold status, there is an absence of evidence of collection
activity prior to claim submission, or the lender was not an eligible lender at the time it
became the holder of the loan. See REGIONAL CLAIMS PROCEDURES, supra note 60, at 110-
24 (rev. 4th ed. 1979).
67. 45 C.F.R. § 177.6(e)(1) (1973). The current language of the regulation is found at
34 C.F.R. § 682.205 (1982). This regulation applies to both the FISLP and to the state
guaranty agency program.
68. 45 C.F.R. § 177.6(e)(2) (1973).
69. See id ("In no event may the costs of making a loan under this part (except those
specifically provided for in this section) be passed on (in the form of higher tuition charges
or otherwise) to the borrower."); see also De Jesus Chavez v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 412 F.
Supp. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (FISLP regulations are designed to protect the students from ex-
cessive charges).
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able to all students, and to prevent such funds from being channelled to
students at particular schools that offered inducements to lenders.
The Department's Broad Interpretation of '7legal Inducements"
In recent years, the Department has increasingly utilized the pro-
hibition against illegal inducements as a ground for denying FISLP de-
fault claims.70 Despite the fact that the illegal inducements regulation
is punitive in nature and, therefore, subject to narrow construction,
71
the Department has adopted a broad interpretation of the regulation to
include inducements of any kind.
72
Thus, a lender faces a complex series of problems when it has a
banking relationship with a school, or with the owners of a school, that
is totally separate from its relationship with the student borrowers; any-
thing of value received by the lender from the school pursuant to that
separate relationship may be subject to scrutiny. Hence, a lender may
innocently engage in conduct as a normal incident to its overall bank-
ing relationship with the school, which constitutes a traditional banking
practice in other- contexts, (for example, compensating balances,
standby commitment fees, accounts receivable financing) but which in
the context of the GSLP may give rise to allegations by the Department
of illegal inducements. 73 In this way, the illegal inducements prohibi-
70. The Department's application of the illegal inducements regulation is being chal-
lenged in several pending cases. See United States v. Medsa Co., No. 81-F1695 (D. Colo.
filed Sept. 23, 1981); American Say. v. Bell, No. 79-1834 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1980) (summary
judgment denied); LTV Educ. Sys., Inc. v. Bell, No. 3-80-0125R (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 28,
1980) (filed Mar. 29, 1979 as No. 79-0905 in D.D.C., transferred to N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 1980).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, (1948) (penal regulations are to be
narrowly construed). Under a narrow construction of the pre-1979 regulation, the prohibi-
tion would be limited strictly to payments of "points, premiums or additional interest of any
kind," which have very specific, technical meanings in a banking context. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 177.6(e)(1) (1973). Under the 1979 regulation, the prohibition is broadly worded to in-
clude "points, premiums, payments, or additional interest of any kind... paid or otherwise
extended." 45 C.F.R § 177.205(a)(1) (1979). While the later version of the regulation is
clearly more all-inclusive, any attempt to apply an equally inclusive interpretation of the
pre-1979 regulation, without adequate notice having been given to lenders, not only would
be contrary to traditional rules of construction, but also would raise due process problems.
Indeed, any prohibited conduct must be sufficiently defined for a reasonable person to un-
derstand and to conform his or her conduct accordingly. F.T.C. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
567 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Thus, it is arguable that any denial of default claims for
inducements that are not expressly prohibited by the regulations would be unconstitutional.
72. See American Say. v. Bell, No. 79-1834 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1980) (summary judg-
ment denied); LTV Educ. Sys., Inc. v. Bell, No. 3-80-0125R (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 28, 1980)
(filed Mar. 29, 1979 as No. 79-0905 in D.D.C., transferred to N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 1980).
73. In at least two pending cases, lenders are challenging the Department's broad inter-
pretation of the regulation. In United States v. Medsa Co., No. 81-F1695 (D. Colo. filed
Sept. 23, 1981), a parent company owned both banking and consulting subsidiaries. Student
STUDENT LOANSJanuary 1983]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tion has served as a readily available vehicle for cutting the federal
government's default losses. In several cases, large blocks of FISLP
loans owned by a single lender have been considered "tainted," and the
Department has sought to deny all liability claims, based on the illegal
inducement regulation.74 Indeed, in one case alone, the Department
dishonored over $5 million in FISLP default claims.7
5
Lenders purchasing student loan notes in the secondary market
are also vulnerable. Their default claims may be denied because of the,
original lender's alleged violation of the regulation.76 Under general
commercial law, it has been argued that FISLP loan notes are not ne-
gotiable instruments77 and, therefore, that purchasers of such notes are
not entitled to the protections available to holders in due course.78
Consequently, purchasers are subject to all the defenses that could be
asserted against previous holders.79 Stated another way, any ground
for denial of default claims that arises as a result of a previous holder's
conduct can be asserted against the subsequent purchaser's default
claims.8 0
Thus, where the originating lender received illegal inducements
from a school-a fact unknown to the secondary market purchaser-
the purchasing lender may find it difficult if not impossible to recover
from the Department. In one pending case, the Department denied
over $600,000 in default claims submitted by a secondary market pur-
chaser, in part because of the originating lenders' alleged violations of
loans from the banking subsidiary were tied to schools' use of the consulting firm subsidiary.
The issue now being litigated is whether school payments to the consulting firm fall within
the prohibition against the payment of "point, premiums or additional interest."
In American Say. v. Bell, No. 79-1834 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1980) (summary judgment de-
nied), a secondary market purchaser of student loans is contesting the Department's conten-
tion that the originating lenders of a package of student loans violated the regulation when
they allegedly accepted brokerage services from the school in finding a secondary market
purchaser for the loans.
74. See supra note 70.
75. LTV Educ. Sys., Inc. v. Bell, No. 3-80-0125R (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 28, 1980).
76. See, e.g., American Say. v. Bell, No. 79-1834 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1980) (summary
judgment denied) (discussed supra note 73).
77. FISLP loan notes are probably not negotiable instruments because (1) they are not
made payable to order or to bearer, and (2) the notes are subject to the terms of the lender's
Contract of Insurance with the Department, including the FISLP regulations which are in-
corporated into the contract. Therefore, enforcement of the notes is subject to terms not
appearing on the notes. See U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1978); see also 41 Fed. Reg. 4497, 4499
(1976).
78. See infra notes 81 & 83.
79. U.C.C. § 3-306 (1978).
80. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 518-19.
[Vol. 34
the regulation."' Although a lender normally can obtain warranties
from the seller when purchasing student loan notes in the secondary
market,82 such protections have been rendered useless when originating
lenders have gone into liquidation or otherwise ceased operations.
83
Procedural, Contractual, and Policy Problems with the Department's Change
of Sanctions for "Illegal Inducement" Violations
Much of the recent debate between the Department and lenders
whose claims have been denied on the ground of illegal inducements
has centered on the legal effect of a violation of the regulation. Until
recently, the Department had consistently held that a violation of the
illegal inducements regulation did not affect the insurability of GSLP
loans. In fact, the agency had expressly indicated that compliance with
the regulation was not a condition of insurance coverage. For instance,
in 1975, then-Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), Caspar W. Weinberger, stated unequivocally that a
violation of the illegal inducements regulation "does not, by itself, af-
fect the insurability of the loan or the obligation of the student to re-
pay."'84 The Department's position was simply that a number of other
sanctions were available for violation of the regulation, short of deny-
ing default claims. These included limitation, suspension, or termina-
tion of a lender's future participation in the program, and a
requirement that the lender refund to the student the excess charges
attributable to the illegal inducement or discount.8 5 Notably, even
81. In American Sav. v. Bell, No. 79-1834 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1980) (summary judgment
denied), the government alleged that the originating lenders had accepted illegal induce-
ments from a school either in the form of higher interest paid on advances made by the
lender to the school, or brokerage services supplied by the school in finding a secondary
market purchaser for the loans, or both. See supra note 73.
82. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.205(f) (1982).
83. In the case of the secondary market purchaser described supra in note 81, the
lender's default claims were denied, and because one of the two originating lenders had gone
into liquidation soon after the transaction, the purchasing lender was left with virtually no
remedy other than pursuing its claim against the government.
84. Letter from Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, to John Hill, Attorney
General of Texas (April 21, 1975), reprinted in 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 338-
40 [hereinafter cited as Weinberger Letter].
85. In connection with alternative sanctions, Secretary Weinberger noted that "section
177.6(e) does not provide an explicit remedy for a violation. One consequence, of course,
might be the limitation, suspension or termination of the lender's participation in the pro-
gram. In addition, however, the Department has attempted to fashion a remedy [involving
lender refunds to students] which presumes that the school has increased its charges to stu-
dents as a result of discounting activities." Weinberger Letter, supra note 84; see also 45
C.F.R. § 177.50 (1973), and 45 C.F.R. §§ 177.71-.78 (1975) (procedures for limitation, sus-
pension, or termination of a lender's participation.
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under the 1979 regulations, neither a mandatory refund nor a limita-
tion, suspension, or termination action affected a lender's rights to in-
surance benefits.8 6 This continued to be agency policy at least until the
late 1970's.87
Thus, the shift in agency policy to the present position of denying
default claims based on the illegal inducements regulation raises seri-
ous legal and policy questions. As a legal matter, any reversal of such a
long-standing policy may be in violation of the rulemaking require-
ments of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), which gov-
erns administrative rulemaking procedures for the Department of
Education. 88 The GEPA requires that all "rules, regulations, guide-
lines, interprelations, orders or requirements of general applicability"
be published in the Federal Register at least 30 days before they be-
come effective. 89 Failure to publish in the Federal Register, regardless
86. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.702 (1982).
87. In late 1976 a case arose involving approximately $900,000 in FISLP loans with
respect to which the original lender had received illegal payments from the student borrow-
ers' schools. Reaffirming Secretary Weinberger's position, the Department's Office of Gen-
eral Counsel concluded that insurance on the loans was not affected by the illegal payments:
"In short, the current regulation does not provide that a violation of § 177.6(e) vitiates the
insurance. . . . The Department has previously announced a policy of not withdrawing
insurance on such loans. For these reasons there would appear to be little, if any, authority
to deny claims filed by the original lender." Memorandum from the Office of General
Counsel to William H. Taft IV, General Counsel, "Crocker National Bank," Off. Gen.
Counsel Opinions at 3 (Nov. 24, 1976) (emphasis in original).
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as GEPA]. The GSLP is
not directly governed by the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) because it fails within the exception provided in 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1976) for mat-
ters relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." (Emphasis added.)
See Bonfield, Public Participaion in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans,
Grants, Benefits or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970). In 1971, however, the agency
by administrative action elected to comply with APA notice and comment requirements.
See 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971).
Amendments to GEPA since 1974 have imposed rulemaking requirements considerably
more stringent than the APA. See Sky, supra note 61, at 131. See also infra note 89 &
accompanying text (explanation of GEPA rulemaking requirements).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(1), (b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). The
rulemaking requirements of the GEPA are broader in scope than the requirements of the
APA, principally because the APA expressly excludes "interpretive rules [and] general state-
ments of policy" from rulemaking requirements. id. § 553(b) (1977). This exclusion has
been construed as applying to agency clarifications of existing regulations and policies hav-
ing no significant impact upon any segment of the public. In re Worksite Inspection, 481 F.
Supp. 491 (D. Me. 1979). By contrast, interpretive rules that (1) have significant effects on
private interests, (2) narrowly constrict the discretion of agency officials by largely determin-
ing the issue addressed, and (3) have substantive effect, must be promulgated according to
APA rulemaking requirements. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Chamber of Commerce v. D.S.H.A., 636 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir.
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of whether a lender has actual notice of the agency's interpretation,
renders that interpretation invalid and unenforceable. 90
The change of sanctions for illegal inducements violations was
clearly a new "interpretation . . . of general applicability" requiring
notice and comment under the GEPA.91 This conclusion is buttressed
by the fact that the other previously mentioned sanctions for violation
of the regulation92 were promulgated pursuant to the GEPA notice and
comment procedures.93 Inasmuch as the agency's new interpretation of
the illegal inducements regulation places a substantial number of lend-
ers' default claims in jeopardy, and because it was implemented with-
out notice and opportunity for comment, any denial of default claims
based on that interpretation is improper.
94
Another legal ramification of the Department's shift in policy with
respect to the illegal inducements regulation is of a contractual nature.
Under the GSLP, lenders may sue the Department in any federal court
for breach of contract based on the wrongful denial of default claims.
95
1980) (both cases held that substantive changes in rule interpretation are not valid unless
published as required by APA and agency rules). The GEPA dispenses with the necessity of
meeting these three criteria by including all "interpretations. . . of general applicability"
within the scope of rulemaking requirements, without exception.
90. See Sky, supra note 61, at 131 (discussion of effect of GEPA publication
requirement).
91. In fact, even under the APA, the Department's change of sanctions would probably
have met the three-pronged criteria for distinguishing substantive rules from mere clarifica-
tions, discussed supra note 89, thereby requiring notice and comment independent of GEPA.
Clearly the new policy, whereby compliance with the regulation is imposed as a condition of
insurance, has an impact on private interests, because the validity of lenders' default claims
is affected. Regional officials' discretion is grossly restricted, because they are given no
choice in determining the validity of claims where violations have occurred. Also, the new
rule is substantive in nature because it affects the vested rights of lenders to insurance bene-
fits. Thus, notwithstanding the requirements of the GEPA, the Department should have
promulgated the new interpretation of the illegal inducements regulation pursuant to the
notice and comment requirements of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1976).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
93. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 43 Fed. Reg. 14,376 (1978); Publication of
Final Regulations with Comments and Responses, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,866, 53,922 (1979).
94. See supra notes 89 & 91 (discussion of notice standards under the APA).
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Lenders are not subject, therefore,
to the requirement that government contract claims be filed in the United States Court of
Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
It should also be noted that the decision whether to seek judicial review of administra-
tive action pursuant to the court's jurisdiction under the APA or to file a claim for breach of
contract, or both, may have important strategic consequences. Under the APA, the lender's
burden of showing arbitrary and capricious administrative action is considerably more oner-
ous and the court's scope of review narrower than under a contract claim where the standard
of proof is by a preponderence of the evidence and the scope of review is de novo. See infra
notes 169-78 & accompanying text.
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In such a contract action, the Department's prior interpretation of the
regulations, which are incorporated as part of a lender's contract, may
be binding against the agency in subsequently construing the lender's
contractual obligations under those regulations.96 In other words, the
Department's original interpretation of the illegal inducements regula-
tion as not affecting the validity of default claims may, as a matter of
contract law, preclude the Department from unilaterally adopting a
different interpretation without complying with applicable rulemaking
requirements. Moreover, because lenders' contracts are wholly pre-
pared by the agency, established rules of construction require that, even
under federal insurance programs, the contract and regulations be
strictly construed against the party who drafted them.97 Thus, in a
purely contractual context, the Department's attempt to read the illegal
inducements regulation as imposing a condition on its insurance obli-
gations is without basis, at least until such a condition is properly
promulgated pursuant to the notice and comment requirements of
rulemaking.98 By improperly changing a once-valid interpretation of
the regulations and basing the denial of claims on this new interpreta-
tion, the Department may be in breach of lenders' contracts. 99
Finally, regarding policy considerations, the denial of default
claims for violation of the illegal inducements regulation has virtually
no basis in the policies underlying the regulation itself. Because the
regulation is intended to prevent higher tuition costs and denial of ac-
cess to GSLP loans due to the channelling of available funds,10° termi-
nating a lender's participation in the program and requiring that it
refund any illegal payments are certainly adequate and appropriate
96. See, e.g., Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1975);
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Heinicke Instruments Co., 441 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1971);
Philips Elec. & Pharmaceutical Indus. Corp. v. Leavens, 421 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1970) (cases
held that when interpreting a contract, the interpretation that the parties to the contract give
to it should be given great weight).
97. See, e.g., Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1976) (federal
crop insurance contracts construed against the federal agency that prepared them).
98. The contract between each lender and the Department provides that "within such
limits as may be set by him, the Commissioner shall insure all loans made by the lender
which are eligible for such insurance under such Acts and the regulations issued thereunder,
which Acts and Regulations, as they may from time to time be amended, are made a part of
this contract." MANUAL FOR LENDERS, supra note 59, at appendixes A.12-.13 (rev. ed. 1976)
(emphasis added). In order for amendments to be incorporated into the contract, however,
they must be adopted in accordance with appropriate rulemaking procedures. See supra
notes 88-91 & accompanying text.
99. At least one lender has based a claim on this contractual theory. See American
Say. v. Bell, No. 79-1834 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1980) (summary judgment denied).
100. See supra note 69 & accompanying text.
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sanctions. The Department has published no findings as to how perva-
sive illegal inducements are, or whether funds are being channeled.
Thus, no justification has been offered for the notion that additional
sanctions are necessary to ensure compliance.
Because illegal inducements operate at the institutional level, they
are not likely to contribute to student defaults. As former HEW Secre-
tary Weinberger recognized, a violation of the regulation does not ad-
versely affect the student borrower's obligation to repay the loan, nor
the federal government's ability to collect from the student.101 Indeed,
the only governmental interest that appears to be served by denying
default claims under the illegal inducements regulation is that of budg-
etary restraint; this interest, when balanced against congressional
objectives in creating the GSLP,10 2 may not be deemed legally suffi-
cient to allow the government to prevail in several pending court
cases. 1
03
The Department's use of the regulation as a shield to avoid default
claim liability is legally defective and without foundation in the poli-
cies underlying the regulation itself. Unfortunately, as the following
discussion illustrates, such unfounded treatment is not limited to the
illegal inducements regulation.
The Exercise of Due Diligence in the Making, Servicing, and Collection of
Guaranteed Loans
The Lack of a Clear Due Diligence Standard
The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, requires that a
lender filing a default claim meet "the standards of due diligence in the
collection of the loan," and that the Department pay the lender's de-
fault claim upon completion of a due diligence investigation. 104 The
statute also requires a lender to exercise reasonable care and diligence
in the making of federally insured loans.
105
101. See Weinberger Letter, supra note 84 & accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 1-3, 16-18, 39-53 & accompanying text.
103. See supra note 70.
104. Higher Education Act of 1965, supra note 1, § 430(a) as amended by Education
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, § 422, 94 Stat. 1367 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1080(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The original version of § 430(a) did not include the due
diligence investigation requirement. It should also be noted that the statute does not ex-
pressly require lenders to exercise due diligence in the servicing of student loans. Because
due diligence in collection often depends upon adequate servicing of a loan, however, the
Department has required due diligence in the servicing of student loans, implying such a
requirement from the due diligence in collection requirement.
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1080(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Several policies underlie the applicable due diligence require-
ments. With regard to the making and disbursing of student loans, the
due diligence requirement protects the government's interests by limit-
ing its potential exposure in the event of default, and by ensuring that if
default occurs, the government receives an enforceable instrument
from the lender upon which to pursue the defaulting student bor-
rower. 0 6 With respect to the servicing and collection of GSLP loans,
the requirement is intended to decrease the likelihood of default and
increase the likelihood of recovery.10
7
Under the state guaranty agency programs, 0 8 states are left to
make their own determinations, subject to Departmental approval, re-
garding the due diligence requirements applicable to lenders making
loans guaranteed by the state agencies, so long as such requirements
are "at least as extensive and forceful as those generally practiced by
financial institutions for consumer loans."' 0 9 In addition, guaranty
agencies themselves are held to standards of due diligence in the collec-
tion of loans with respect to which default claims have been paid by the
agencies." 0 Although numerous due diligence standards have been es-
tablished and applied by the states to both lenders and guaranty agen-
cies, the Department has avoided exercising any significant control
over the content of state due diligence standards.II' This situation may
change, however, as the FISLP is phased out and state programs be-
come more significant." 12
The development of due diligence guidelines for the FISLP has
been the primary responsibility of the Department and is the area
where lenders have had the most difficulty. Before 1979, the regula-
106. As the United States Court of Claims stated: "A major reason for this requirement
is to protect the financial integrity of the program by minimizing the potential governmental
liability under it. Lender practices that diminish the enforceability of the promissory notes
increase the government's losses as insurer by limiting its ability to collect from the default-
ing students." American Bank v. United States, 633 F.2d 543, 547 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
107. A somewhat separate due diligence requirement, often included under the rubric of
due diligence in collection, is the requirement under 34 C.F.R. § 686.516(e)(1) (1982) that
default claims be filed within 90 days of the final demand letter. Although the timely filing
of default claims is technically a separate requirement from due diligence, courts have
treated the timely filing requirement as part of the overall duty to exercise due diligence in
collection. See, e.g., American Bank, 633 F.2d at 549. For a discussion of the policy under-
lying the due diligence in collection requirement, see infra note 132.
108. See supra note 5 (description of state guaranty agencies).
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1085(i) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 682.200 (1982).
110. 34 C.F.R. § 682.401(c)(3) (1982); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(2)(A) (1976).
111. The Department has rejected proposals that would have required guaranty agen-
cies to adopt FISLP standards for due diligence. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,868 (1979).
112. See supra note 5.
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tions only defined due diligence with respect to collection, and then
only in the most general terms."13 Lenders were required to "utilize
collection practices no less extensive and forceful than those generally
in force among financial institutions." 1 4 Given the variety of collec-
tion practices prevailing throughout the country, this definition offered
little guidance to lenders.
No attempt was made in the regulations to identify or otherwise
define the standards for collection practices among financial institu-
tions. Indeed, no specific due diligence guidelines of any kind were
provided for commercial lenders until the 1976 publication of Manual
For Lenders. Those guidelines, moreover, were directory rather than
mandatory." 5 Thus, for the first ten years of the GSLP, even after the
1976 Manual For Lenders was published, commercial lenders had to
determine for themselves what collection measures should be taken
that would be consistent with the practices "generally in force among
financial institutions."
Denial of Default Claimsfor Breach of the Due Diligence Standard in
Collection Practices
Despite considerable confusion among lenders as to their due dili-
gence responsibilities, the Department has increasingly relied upon the
due diligence requirements as grounds for denying default claims.
Common problems encountered by lenders involve the timeliness of
both due diligence collection efforts and the filing of claims. 16 While
113. The only specific due diligence requirement was that final demand letters be sent
not less than 30 nor more than 60 days before claims were filed with the Department. 45
C.F.R. § 177.48(a)(3) (1973). This provision is discussed in detail infra notes 135-37 & ac-
companying text.
114. 45 C.F.R. § 177.48(b) (1973). Typical collection procedures among financial insti-
tutions include telephone calls and written correspondence of increasing forcefulness re-
questing and finally demanding payment. There is no consistent practice among financial
institutions, however, regarding the number or frequency of such requests or demands
before a borrower is placed in default.
115. See MANUAL FOR LENDERS, supra note 59, at I1.4 (rev. ed. 1976). The 1972
MANUAL FOR LENDERS listed typically acceptable collection procedures for educational in-
stitutions, insurance companies, and pension funds. MANUAL FOR LENDERS, supra note 59,
exhibit 11-4 (1972). There was no indication prior to 1976, however, that such procedures
were applicable or even desirable for the commercial lenders constituting the majority of
lenders in the program. The Department tacitly acknowledged the inadequacy of the regu-
lations in 1979, when the collection measures suggested in the 1976 MANUAL FOR LENDERS
were incorporated in large part into the 1979 regulations as mandatory requirements. 45
C.F.R. §§ 177.509-.511 (1979). This occurred only after repeated requests by lenders to the
Department to provide concrete, consolidated due diligence standards.
116. One reason that timeliness is often an issue is that delays in either collection efforts
or claims filing are most easily spotted by the Department's claims personnel from "docu-
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delays in collection or claims submission are at times the result of
lender neglect, delays also occur because the lender simply did not
know when repayment should have begun.
A lender can ordinarily rely on a student's anticipated graduation
date in determining when repayment should begin. If a student ceases
to be at least a half-time student before graduation, however, the six- to
twelve-month grace period preceding repayment automatically be-
gins.117 Generally, lenders are informed of a student borrower's enroll-
ment status by means of a reporting arrangement between the school
and the Department, and between the Department and the lender. 8l,
For example, the school reports whether a student is still enrolled and
attending classes on Student Confirmation Reports." i9 The Department
then passes along the information about the student's enrollment or
withdrawal to the lender via quarterly Federal Loan Transaction State-
ments. 120 Problems have arisen where schools have closed or students
have withdrawn from school, and the Department has been slow in
reporting these changes to lenders. 12I In such instances, through no
fault of the lender, borrowers have entered the repayment period with-
out the lender's knowledge.
During the early years of the program, the Department's policy
was that the default claims of a lender acting in good faith would not
be denied on the ground that the lender failed to ascertain changes in a
student's status. 122 More recently, however, the Department has taken
mentation submitted with default claims. See REGIONAL CLAIMS PROCEDURES, supra note
60, at 41-43 (rev. 4th ed. 1979) (description of claims review procedures for due diligence).
117. See 44 Fed. Reg. 53,915 (1979). Repayment should begin between 9 and 12 months
after a borrower ceases to be at least a half-time student. In the case of a correspondence
student, the 9- to 12-month grace period begins either 60 days after the student fails to
submit an assignment or after the stated normal time for completion of the course. 34
C.F.R. § 682.507(a) (1982). Under the 1980 amendments to the Higher Education Act, the
9- to 12-month grace period was shortened to 6 months for new loans. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1077(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
118. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1077(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981), students are also required to re-
port changes in enrollment status to lenders, but this provision is virtually unenforceable
once a loan is disbursed. See infra note 130 & accompanying text for a discussion of school
responsibilities to report changes in enrollment status to lenders.
119. 34 C.F.R. § 682.612 (1982).
120. See MANUAL FOR LENDERS, supra note 59, at appendix A.15 (rev. ed. 1976).
121. See Memorandum from Theodore Sky, Acting Assistant General Counsel for Edu-
cation, to Dr. Terrel H. Bell, Commissioner of Education, "Eligibility under Guaranteed
Student Loan Program on proposed loans to students at McCarrie Schools," Off. Gen.
Counsel Opinions (Jan. 13, 1976); see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVE-
MENTS NEEDED IN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM 12
(1973).
122. See Letter from Carl H. Harper, Regional Attorney to Dr. Cecil L. Yarbrough,
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the position that the lender is responsible for learning of changes in a
student's status, pursuant to the lender's duty to exercise due diligence
in the servicing of FISLP loans.' 23 Under this new policy, lenders may
not continue to rely on anticipated graduation dates. Indeed, collection
effort delays due to a lack of notice of changes in student status are
considered violations of due diligence requirements, thereby justifying
the denial of default claims.124 The lender's problem is magnified be-
cause students who withdraw from school before graduation are more
likely to default.'
25
Procedural, Contractual and Policy Problems Related to the New Due
Diligence Collection Requirements
By reinterpreting the due diligence collection requirements, the
Department has effected another defacto reallocation of risk to lenders.
As with the illegal inducements regulation, this policy shift was accom-
plished without the notice and opportunity for public comment re-
quired by the GEPA.126 In fact, even the 1979 regulations, which
purported to define lender responsibilities in greater detail, are silent
with regard to any lender duty to monitor a student's enrollment sta-
tus. 27 By tacitly imposing this additional duty upon lenders, and by
then denying claims on that basis, the Department has unilaterally and
improperly shifted to lenders the risk of loss when students leave school
and default on their loans.
Lenders are now required to shoulder the additional cost and in-
convenience of monitoring school enrollments, when such duties are
neither included in the insurance contracts nor required by the regula-
tions incorporated into such contracts. 12  Because lenders are not con-
tractually required to monitor school enrollment, the Department's
denial of default claims for failure to do so may itself be a breach of the
Office of Education, "Request for Legal Opinion on Commerce Union Bank and American
Training Services," Off. Gen. Counsel Opinions at 7 (Feb. 23, 1976).
123. 45 C.F.R. § 177.510(b) (1979); see same language in current version, 34 C.F.R.
§ 682.510 (1982).
124. This issue is currently being litigated in American Say. v. Bell, No. 79-1834 (D.D.C.
Dec. 17, 1980) (summary judgment denied).
125. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
ADMINISTRATION OF THE GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM (1973).
126. Before a rule of general applicability can become effective, it must be published in
the Federal Register. See supra notes 88-90 & accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion.
127. See 45 C.F.R. § 177.510 (1979).
128. See supra notes 54 & 98 (discussion of regulations as part of the insurance
contracts).
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insurance contracts.1 29
Placing the burden of monitoring enrollment status on lenders
substantially increases their risk, because often their only source of stu-
dent status information is the Department. As discussed earlier, the
Department has imposed no duty on schools to report changes in stu-
dent status directly to lenders.' 30 Given the moderate returns earned
by lenders on FISLP loans, the added risks and cost burdens of main-
taining affirmative contact with schools in order to monitor each stu-
dent borrower's enrollment status will, contrary to congressional intent,
discourage lender participation in the program.
13'
Due Diligence and the Timely Filing of Default Claims
In addition to the foregoing problems involving the timeliness of
collection efforts, the deadline for filing default claims presents its own
special problems. 32 Under the pre-1979 regulation, the lender had to
send the final demand for payment within sixty days of the filing of a
default claim. I33 Considerable controversy has centered on whether
129. Cf supra notes 95-98 & accompanying text (contract analysis of the Department
policy changes).
130. See supra notes 118-22 & accompanying text. The Department considered revising
the arrangement for reporting student status by having schools report directly to lenders
within 60 days after any change in a student's enrollment status. 43 Fed. Reg. 14,384, 14,418
(1978) (proposed Apr. 5, 1978). The Department expressly rejected that duty, however, on
the grounds that such additional reporting requirements would be unduly burdensome to
schools, and that reporting student status to the Department via Student Confirmation Re-
ports was adequate. See 44 Fed. Reg. 53,867 (1979).
131. See 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 239-40 (testimony of Edward A. Fox,
President of the Student Loan Marketing Association).
132. The policies underlying the timely filing requirement are different from the policies
served by the other due diligence requirements discussed in the text. The filing deadline is
intended to ensure that the government receives a fresh claim upon which to pursue the
defaulting student borrower, American Bank v. United States, 633 F.2d at 549, and to avoid
paying an unnecessary amount of interest or special allowances while the claim is held by
the lender. See 44 Fed. Reg. 53,915 (1979).
Until 1978, however, relatively few defaulting student borrowers were pursued for col-
lection by the Department. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COLLEC-
TION EFFORTS NOT KEEPING PACE WITH GROWING NUMBER OF DEFAULTED STUDENT
LOANS (1977). The General Accounting Office found that of $287 million in default claims
paid by the Department through September 1976, only $25 million had ever been collected
from the student borrowers. Id at 7. In particular, the GAO observed that "[a]s of October
1976, only about 1,150 of more than 280,000 defaulted student loans acquired by [the De-
partment]. . . had been referred to GAO or the Department of Justice for consideration of
possible legal action." Id at 16. Defaulting student borrowers risked only four chances in a
thousand of having legal action considered against them. Thus, the government itself ig-
nored the policy underlying the default claim filing deadline; students were rarely pursued
while the claims were "fresh."
133. Prior to September, 1979, the regulation read in pertinent part: "The Commis-
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that regulation imposes a mandatory filing deadline or only a directory
filing requirement. Until the late 1970's, default claims filed more than
sixty days after the date of demand letters were never denied for that
reason, because the Department did not interpret the regulation as im-
posing a mandatory deadline.' 34 Neither the 1972 nor the 1976 Manual
For Lenders informed lenders of any mandatory deadline for filing
claims. 3
5
Initially, the regulation was not interpreted as imposing a
mandatory filing deadline because, in part, the circumstances sur-
rounding many student defaults precluded the filing of default claims
within sixty days. Specifically, the majority of defaults occurred at one
time of the year (thirteen months after June graduation) and the sixty-
day period was not considered enough time to prepare and file all
claims. 136 In fact, once the Department began denying claims in the
late 1970's for untimely filing, it tacitly admitted the unreasonableness
of the sixty-day deadline by extending the filing period to ninety
days. 137
Unfortunately, when the Department reversed its interpretation of
the regulation to impose a mandatory filing requirement, lenders were
sioner will honor claims for reimbursement... only if.. .a written demand for payment
has been made on the borrower and any endorser on a defaulted note not less than 30 days
nor more than 60 days prior to the filing of the claims for loss." 45 C.F.R. § 177.48(a)(3)
(1973). By contrast, 45 C.F.R. § 177.516(e)(1) (1979) states clearly that a lender "must file a
default claim with the Commissioner within 90 days after the loan has been determined to
be in default."
134. The clearest evidence of the agency's interpretation of the regulation lies in its own
REGIONAL CLAIMS PROCEDURES manuals. The 1977 through 1979 editions of that manual
establish guidelines for claims approval or denial by the Department's claims personnel.
Despite the fact that these claims manuals provide detailed checklists of grounds for claims
denial, no provision appears for denying claims based on any filing deadline in 45 C.F.R.
§ 177A8(a)(3) (1973). See, e.g., REGIONAL CLAIMS PROCEDURES, SUpra note 60, at 7-14 (rev.
3d ed. 1977). In fact, the 1977 manual provides a model Claim Review Sheet where expe-
dited payment is recommended, even though the claim was filed long after the deadline. Id
at 17.
135. The 1972 MANUAL FOR LENDERS is silent with regard to the deadline for filing
claims.. Its only reference to 45 C.F.R. § 177A8(a)(3) concerns the final demand letter rather
than any deadline for filing claims. See MANUAL FOR LENDERS, supra note 59, IV-10
(1972). The 1976 MANUAL FOR LENDERS also focuses on the final demand for payment,
indicating that the demand letter must be sent not less than 30 nor more than 60 days prior
to filing a claim. Moreover, the 1976 MANUAL goes on to state in non-mandatory terms that
the lendermay file a default claim after 30 days. See MANUAL FOR LENDERS, supra note 59,
V.4.4.2 (rev. ed. 1976).
136. See 44 Fed. Reg. 53,915 (1979) (lender comments regarding 90-day filing period).
137. See 45 C.F.R. § 177.516(e)(1) (1979). Lenders have commented that even 90 days
is often an insufficient amount of time in which to process and file claims. 44 Fed. Reg.
53,915 (1979).
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never informed. The only signal of the change in policy was an inter-
nal bulletin to the Department's regional offices ordering them to deny
any claim filed more than sixty days after the demand letter. 13 Thus, a
number of lenders were caught in the middle, without having known of
a mandatory deadline and without the benefit of an extended ninety-
day filing period.'
39
The only reported case dealing specifically with the filing deadline
issue is American Bank v. United States. 140 There, the lender failed to
file its claims for three to eleven months after the time when the de-
mand letters should have been sent. The Court of Claims ruled that
the lender's failure to file within sixty days of the demand letters was
adequate grounds for denial of the lender's default claims.' 4 ' Signifi-
cantly, however, the agency's prior interpretation of the regulation as a
directory rather than mandatory deadline was never argued before the
court. 142 In fact, there is no indication that the court was even aware of
the Department's prior interpretation of the regulation.143 Conse-
quently, American Bank provides little guidance on the question of the
legality of the agency's reversal of position.
Indeed, there are serious questions as to whether the Department's
midstream policy shift is at odds with due process and the General Ed-
ucation Provisions Act. 4 While the filing deadline applied to all de-
fault claims arising after the 1979 regulation was promulgated, lenders
had not been given adequate notice of the Department's new policy.
From a due process standpoint, it is imperative that lenders know what
the requirements of the regulations are, in order to conform their con-
duct accordingly.' 45 The unannounced shift to a mandatory filing
deadline and subsequent denial of default claims for noncompliance
amounts to a denial of lenders' constitutional rights to due process.
Moreover, the Department's implementation of the mandatory dead-
138. Bulletin to Regional Directors, No. R-83 (1979).
139. See, e.g., American Bank v. United States, 633 F.2d 543,549 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 942 (D.C.W. Va. 1981); Bell & Howell
Educ. Group, Inc. v. Secretary of Educ., No. 81-C-531 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 4, 1981).
140. 633 F.2d 543, 548-50 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
141. Id at 549.
142. See Plaintifis Motion for Summary Judgment at 25, American Bank, 633 F.2d 543.
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment at 21-24, id Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 12-14, id
143. See id;American Bank, 633 F.2d at 548-50.
144. See supra notes 88-91 & accompanying text for a detailed discussion of GEPA and
APA requirements.
145. See supra note 71 (discussion of due process requirements).
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line without notice violates the administrative rulemaking require-
ments of the GEPA as well.
As discussed earlier, the GEPA requires that any interpretation of
general applicability be published in the Federal Register before it be-
comes effective. 46 The imposition of a mandatory deadline is clearly
an interpretation of sufficient general applicability for the notice re-
quirements of the GEPA to apply. Consequently, having failed to pub-
lish notice of the change in the Federal Register, the Department's
denial of claims based on the sixty-day filing requirement is
improper.147
Thus, as is true of the Department's treatment of the illegal in-
ducements regulation, important changes in lender responsibilities and
liabilities have been effectuated without adequate notice to lenders or
the opportunity for public comment. Both the shift of the duty to mon-
itor student enrollment status and the imposition of mandatory rather
than directory deadlines for the filing of default claims have resulted in
the rejection of a substantial number of otherwise valid claims.
148
The process by which these new policies have been implemented
raises the possibility that other new and unknown risks could be im-
posed on lenders currently holding student loans in their portfolios. If
lenders have not been adequately informed of changes in their contrac-
tual duties and relationship with the government in the past, there is
every reason to believe that similar situations may arise in the future.
Finally, the foregoing problems have implications not only for
those lenders still holding student loans, but also for lenders whose de-
fault claims have already been paid. The latter lenders are subject to a
repurchase requirement if due diligence defects are subsequently dis-
146. See supra notes 88-91 (discussion of GEPA requirements). A shift in the interpre-
tation of a regulation as being directory in nature on the one hand, to an interpretation of
the regulation as being mandatory on the other, requires notice to those affected by the
regulation. Cf. Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1971) (candidate's due process
rights violated when the City Board of Elections changed rules governing signatures without
notifying candidates).
147. In a case involving a publication requirement under the Economic Opportunity
Act, similar to that under GEPA, implementation of a new but unpublished policy was
barred despite actual notice of the policy change. See Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 81-82 (D.D.C. 1973); cf Gardiner v. Tarr, 341 F.
Supp. 422, 433-35 (D.D.C. 1972) (policy change implemented by internal directives sent by
Selective Service System to regional offices held to have no force and effect in view of failure
to publish directives in Federal Register).
148. American Bank v. United States, 633 F.2d 543 (Ct. Cl. 1980); American Say. v.
Bell, No. 79-1834 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1980) (summary judgment denied).
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covered by the government. 149 Thus, claims previously paid may be
subject to review, and recovery from lenders may be sought.
Public Policy Implications of the Department's Treatment of
Lender Default Claims
In direct contrast to the Department of Education's treatment of
lenders, Congress has repeatedly manifested its intent to maintain a
proper balance between lender risk and lender return on the student
loan notes. 150 The approach taken by Congress in recent years to stem
losses due to student defaults has been to do so not at the expense of
lenders. Rather, Congress has sought to restructure the program to re-
duce the likelihood of student defaults and to provide more effective
sanctions against those who do default, sI thus reflecting Congress' per-
ception that student defaults are a problem caused by students, not by
lenders.15 2
Unfortunately, given the Department's proclivity toward changing
GSLP rules in midstream, lenders may have reason to conclude that
the increased risks, coupled with rising administrative cost burdens, are
not offset by the moderate rate of return from interest payments and
special allowances. Because guaranteed student loans typically repre-
sent only a small portion of a lender's loan portfolio, the capital now
reserved for student loans could easily be shifted to other more profita-
ble and less risky investments. 153 As noted earlier, this process may
have already begun. 154
Recent developments indicate that lenders under state guaranty
agency programs are likely to come under similar scrutiny in the fu-
ture, as commitments under the FISLP diminish. 55 Historically, de-
fault claims submitted to such agencies have almost never been
examined by the Department. 156 Guaranty agencies have simply re-
ported aggregate default losses to the Department and have been reim-
149. 20 U.S.C. § 1080(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); MANUAL FOR LENDERS, supra note 59,
V.8.3.1 (rev. ed. 1976).
150. See supra notes 39-53 & accompanying text.
151. See supra note 23.
152. See generally Student Loan Defaults: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomtrn on
Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) (hearings on causes and cures for student defaults).
153. See generally WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE COLLEGE BOARD, supra note 27.
154. See supra notes 30-32 & accompanying text.
155. See supra note 5.
156. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN
PROGRAM NEEDS A THOROUGH REDESIGN TO ACCOUNT FOR THE EXPENDITURE OF BIL-
LIONS 8-11 (1981).
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bursed pursuant to their reinsurance agreements with the
Department. 157 In 1981, however, Congress for the first time author-
ized the Department to require guaranty agencies to assign to the De-
partment any loan notes for which the agencies have received federal
reimbursement.1 58
Once the Department begins reviewing individual default claims
for purposes of post-default collection, a necessary step in the process
will be the examination of claims for defects affecting the enforceability
of the loan notes. Given recent policies, it is highly unlikely that the
Department will simply ignore defects in claims, rather than require
lenders to repurchase the notes. Consequently, problems now being
experienced by lenders under the FISLP may be harbingers of
problems to be faced by lenders under the state guaranty agency
programs.
The foregoing problems are compounded by the fact that in many
instances the Department's treatment of lenders is unlikely to be sub-
ject to judicial correction. Lenders may seek judicial review where de-
fault claims are wrongfully denied. Owing to the relatively small dollar
amounts involved with each claim, however, the high costs of litigation
relative to the potential recovery are not often justified.1 59 Conse-
quently, lenders may be without an adequate remedy other than with-
drawal from the program. When this is the case, the Department's
policies threaten ultimately to frustrate basic congressional objectives
by reducing the availability of financial assistance to students, thereby
denying them access to higher education.
The deterioration of lender confidence in the program is occurring
when student financial assistance provided by private lenders is most
needed. The current economic recession has resulted in widespread
unemployment, with many people electing to return to school because
they are unable to find work. Meanwhile, high interest rates and tight
credit make alternative sources of education financing unavailable in
many cases. Unfortunately, other forms of federal and state student
financial aid have been subject to the same budgetary pressures as the
GSLP, and some have fared even worse.1 60 Thus, the effects of a sig-
157. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.406 (1982).
158. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 537(c)(2), 95
Stat. 357, 456 (1981) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(8) (Supp. V 1981)).
159. In many ways, the limited opportunities for recovery explain the paucity of case
law in this area. Those cases that have been litigated generally involve a large number of
individual claims with aggregate values in excess of $100,000.
160. See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, tit. V, Pub. L. No. 97-
35, § 516, 95 Stat. 446-47 (1981) (appropriations for higher education).
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nificant loss of lender confidence and a drop in lender participation
could be dramatic.
Toward a More Rational Administration of the Guaranteed
Student Loan Program: Denial of Default Claims only
for Material Defects
Given the problems associated with the Department's administra-
tion of the GSLP over the past decade, there is a pressing need for the
adoption of consistent and sound policies toward lenders that will re-
store lender confidence in the program. First and foremost, the De-
partment must abide by the strictures of the GEPA and provide lenders
with adequate notice of changes in the requirements and policies affect-
ing the allocation of risk under the program. This approach would af-
ford lenders who found the additional risks unacceptable an
opportunity to adjust their loan portfolios accordingly. In addition, it
would eliminate the element of unknown risk generated by unan-
nounced changes in lender duties and responsibilities.
Beyond the question of adequate notice of program requirements,
at least with regard to the FISLP portion of the GSLP, is the issue of
default claim administration. The Department of Education itself has
recognized that the GSLP is comparable to any insurance business.'
61
In the area of insurance law, courts have increasingly recognized that
only material defects in an insurance claim justify the insurer's denial
of the claim.' 62 In order to find that a material defect exists, it must
appear that the extent of the insurer's liability or the insurer's ability to
recover or to evaluate the loss were in some way prejudiced by the
noncompliance of the policyholder. 63 Within the context of the
161. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 537.
162. See Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P.2d 311 (1968); Campbell v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963); State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345 (Del. 1974); Leach v. Farmer's Auto. Interinsurance Exch., 70
Idaho 156, 213 P.2d 920 (1950); Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Rosenbaum, 30 Md. App. 74, 351
A.2d 197 (1976); Wendel v. Swanberg, 384 Mich. 468, 185 N.W.2d 348 (1971); Reliance Ins.
Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 307 Minn. 338, 239 N.W.2d 922 (1976); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Walley, 174 Miss. 365, 164 So. 16 (1935); Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J.
86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 46 N.C. App. 427, 265
S.E.2d 467 (1980); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 116 Ohio App. 22,
186 N.E.2d 208 (1961); Fox v. National Sav. Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 19 (Okla. 1967); Lusch v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 272 Or. 593, 538 P.2d 902 (1975); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977); Pickering v. American Employees Ins. Co., 10 R.I. 143,
282 A.2d 584 (1971); Squires v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 274 S.C. 58, 145 S.E.2d 673
(1965); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gentry, 202 Va. 338, 117 S.E.2d 76 (1960).
163. See, e.g., Brown v. Security Fire & Indem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Va. 1965).
In the cases cited supra note 162, the courts have generally required that the insurer show
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GSLP, this would mean that a lender's noncompliance must have
either impaired the enforceability of the loan note or contributed to the
student's default. 64
These concepts are not new to the GSLP. The Department's Re-
gional Claims Procedures manual, the internal staff manual which es-
tablishes operating guidelines for default claims processing, directs
claims examiners to deny default claims for lapses in due diligence col-
lection activity only where it appears that the lapse contributed to de-
fault.' 65 Similarly, the 1979 regulations authorize excuse of defects in
default claims where the defects have neither impaired the note's en-
forceability nor contributed to the student borrower's default. 166 Thus,
Department officials clearly have authority to limit instances of claims
denial to cases involving material defects in default claims.167 In most
cases, however, Department officials have ignored the provisions al-
lowing the excuse or curing of defects. Instead, they have rejected
actual prejudice to its right under the insurance contract, rather than simply showing some
speculative or remote possibility of prejudice.
164. See 44 Fed. Reg. 53,916 (1979).
165. REGIONAL CLAIMS PROCEDURES, supra note 60, at 41 (rev. ed. 1979).
166. The regulation in question, 34 C.F.R. § 682.517(g) (1982), reads as follows:
Circumstances under which defects in claims may be cured or excused.
(1) The Commissioner may permit a lender to cure certain defects in a speci-
fied manner as a condition for payment of a default claim.
(2) The Commissioner may excuse certain defects-
(i) If the holder submitting the default claim satisfies the Commissioner that
the defect did not contribute to default or prejudice the Commissioner s attempt to
collect on the loan from the borrower, or
(ii) If the defect arose while the holder submitting the default claim was
holding the loan but the Commissioner had previously found that the holder had
procedures in effect sufficient to ensure that such a defect would not normally arise.
(3) The Commissioner may also excuse certain defects if the Commissioner
is satisfied that-
(i) The defect arose while the loan was held by another lender,
(ii) The assignment of the loan was an arm's length transaction;
(iii) The present holder did not know of the defect at the time of the assign-
ment; and
(iv)(A) The present holder could not have become aware of the defect
through an examination of the loan documents; or
(B) The present holder had relied on a finding by the Commissioner that the
lender holding the loan when the defect arose had procedures in effect sufficient to
ensure that such a defect would not normally arise. (Emphasis added.)
167. A separate problem arises as to whether aparticular Department official has au-
thority to waive or allow the curing or excuse of defects. Section 177.517(g) gives express
authority only to the Commissioner of Education, and whether any official below the Com-
missioner's level has such authority depends on whether the authority has been delegated.
The two reported decisions that have addressed this issue concluded, largely on the basis of
affidavits from agency officials, that no official below the Associate Commissioner level has
the authority to waive regulatory requirements. See American Bank, 633 F.2d at 552; Hicks
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claims in the pursuit of short-term cost reductions, at the expense of the
long-term goal of greater lender participation in the program. 6
Where the Department excuses a defect in one case, however, any re-
fusal to do so in a substantially similar case would constitute arbitrary
and capricious administrative action.169 Thus, those few cases where
defects have been excused or cured should preclude a different treat-
ment of claims submitted by similarly situated lenders in the future.
When a lender seeks judicial review under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 170 of a decision by the Department to deny a claim, the
lender carries a difficult burden even if it can show that similar defects
were excused or cured in other instances. It must show that no
prejudice resulted from the defect, pursuant to the 1979 regulations.' 7 '
In such instances, the critical question is likely to be whether substan-
tial evidence supports a finding that the Department was prejudiced by
v. Califano, 450 F. Supp. 278, 284 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'dsub nom. Hicks v. Harris, 606 F.2d
65, 69 (5th Cir. 1979).
This conclusion appears to be correct at least with regard to regional offices of the De-
partment, which comprise the agency's "front line" for claims processing. Section 403(c)(1)
of the GEPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1221c(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), prohibits any delegation of
authority to regional officers not in effect as of June 1, 1973 without express approval from
Congress. Prior to that date, no delegation of waiver authority had been made to regional
offices. See Memorandum from the Office of General Counsel to T.H. Bell, Commissioner,
Off. Gen. Counsel Opinions (May 14, 1975).
168. As discussed earlier, the number of lenders participating in the program has been
steadily decreasing. See supra note 32 & accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Basic Media, Ltd. v. FCC, 599 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
170. The procedures for administrative adjudication of claims against the Department
are not provided by the GEPA. See H.R. REP. No. 1137, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 141, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE & AD. NEws 4971, 5111 (GEPA administrative appeals provisions inap-
plicable to GSLP). The agency's decision to pay or deny a default claim under the FISLP is
accomplished by informal adjudication, and need not comply with the formal adjudicatory
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976). Similarly,
the refusal to excuse or allow the curing of a defect constitutes only an informal adjudica-
tion. Within the context of informal adjudication, the Department is limited to the grounds
originally stated for such a refusal. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973). If no grounds
are given, the reviewing court must obtain the necessary reasons for the Department's re-
fusal by means of testimony from agency officials who made the decision. Id; Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971); see generally K. DAvis, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01-6 (Supp. 1982).
It should be noted, however, that where the claim of arbitrary and capricious adminis-
trative action is coupled with a cause of action for breach of contract, the agency is not
limited in the defenses or counterclaims it may raise to the contract claim. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1082(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Likewise, the reviewing court is not limited in the scope
of its review of the contract claim, and must conduct a de novo review of the evidence on the
issues of whether defects in a claim were material, or whether the agency had established a
course-of-dealing by virtue of other claims where defects were waived. See K. DAvIs, supra,
§ 29.09 (1982 Supp.).
171. See 45 C.F.R. § 177.51 7 (g)(2) (1979).
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the lender's noncompliance. 172 "Substantial evidence" has been de-
fined as such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion. 173 However, the Supreme Court's characterization of sub-
stantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla of evidence" 174 is per-
haps more descriptive of the considerable discretion given agency
officials in weighing the evidence. Indeed, the burden placed on lend-
ers by this evidentiary standard is tantamount to a requirement that the
lender disprove even the possibility that the defect contributed to de-
fault or impaired the enforceability of the loan note.1 5 Whether this
burden can be overcome depends on the character of the alleged
violation.
For example, where claims involve lapses in due diligence collec-
tion activities, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to disprove any
possibility of prejudice, and it is likely that the Department would pre-
vail in such a case. 176 By contrast, other types of defects have no effect
on either student defaults or the enforceability of loans. A violation of
the illegal inducements regulation, for example, involves the lender's
relationship with the school, not with the defaulting student. 177 In
these cases, the principal hurdle is not the substantial evidence stan-
dard, but, arguably, the showing of past instances where similar defects
have been excused or cured.
78
172. Under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1977), the substantial evidence test applies
only to formal adjudications. The courts have increasingly recognized, however, that in
reviewing informal agency proceedings, the differences between the substantial evidence and
arbitrary and capricious standards is largely semantic. Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v.
FAA, 600 F.2d 965, 971-72 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pacific Legal Foundation v. Dep't of
Trans., 593 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and cases cited therein. As Judge
Friendly noted in Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d
Cir. 1973), "in the 'class of cases in which the ground for challenging the agency action is the
inadequacy of its evidentiary basis, it is difficult to imagaine a decision having no substantial
evidence to support it which is not "arbitrary," or a decision struck down as arbitrary which
is in fact supported by "substantial evidence."' " Id at 349 (quoting Scalia & Goodman,
ProceduralAspects f the Consumer Product Safety A4ct, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 899, 935 n.138
(1973)).
173. See, e.g., United States Health Club, Inc. v. Major, 182 F. Supp. 759 (D.N.J. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 292 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 896 (1961).
174. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
175. In other words, only slight evidence of prejudice is required, even if the bulk of
evidence shows that prejudice to the government did not occur. Associated Indus, Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d at 349.
176. For instance, the lender in American Bank was unsuccessful with a similar argu-
ment when it claimed that the government suffered no prejudice from the late filing of de-
fault claims, because the students had defaulted. 633 F.2d at 549-50.
177. See supra notes 67-103 & accompanying text.
178. In this regard, the compilation of Off. Gen. Counsel Opinions, supra note 60, is a
helpful source of information regarding the Department's past treatment of similar claims.
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In summary, the central issue is still whether the Department
should erect obstacles to lender recovery in the first place. A secondary
question is whether the denial of a claim, whenever more than a scin-
tilla of evidence shows prejudice to the government, is really conducive
to restoring lender confidence in the government's promise to insure
student loans. By virtue of the regulation authorizing Department offi-
cials to excuse or allow the curing of defects, the Department already
has standards for determining whether a defect is material, that is,
whether the defect has contributed to default or impaired the enforce-
ability of the loan note. The challenge, therefore, is to apply those
standards in a uniform manner, consistent with congressional policies
underlying program objectives, not solely for the purpose of achieving
short-term fiscal objectives.
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that the Department of Education has developed
a shortsighted approach to lender participation in the GSLP. Given
the current fiscal climate and massive government outlays for special
allowance and claim payments, the Department's efforts to curtail its
growing expenditures have focused on the most accessible and vulnera-
ble participants in the program, the lenders. If the Department persists
in its pattern of unannounced changes in program requirements, GSLP
loans will not be considered the minimal risk investments that lenders
came to expect during the first decade of the program. For this reason,
lenders should be extremely cautious in undertaking and administering
the GSLP portion of their loan portfolios.
By implementing such unannounced changes in lender responsi-
bilities, and by undermining the insurability of many otherwise fully
guaranteed loans, the Department of Education has effected a defacto
reallocation of risks under the GSLP, with the result that the invest-
ment security sought by lenders in making or purchasing GSLP loan
notes may have been illusory. In the future, lenders may limit their
risk exposure by refusing to participate in the program, and by selling
loan notes to Sallie Mae when the notes enter repayment status.
Thus, the Department's treatment of lenders' default claims may
have grave policy implications for the future of the program, especially
in those states without guaranty agency programs. Certainly, Congress'
goal has been to make higher education available to more Americans;
however, a continuation of the Department's policies may frustrate that
aim, unless lender confidence in the fair administration of the program
can be restored. The challenge before the Reagan Administration,
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therefore, is to rid the program of shackles imposed by an entrenched
bureaucracy and, thereby, enable lenders to serve vital educational
needs that are now languishing.

